

Macroeconomics with Learning and Misspecifications

A General Theory and Applications

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Macro Reading Group

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 - However, abandoning rational expectations leads a modeler into the "wilderness of bounded rationality" (Sargent)
 - Recent profusion of different behavioral models
- ▶ This paper proposes a unified and flexible framework of behavioral macroeconomics
 - Build a theory where agents face constraints on beliefs & behaviors
 - Agents' model of the economy is different from the one they live in :
 - Their model is "misspecified"
 - They can learn about the economy and take optimal decisions

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 - Concept of "*Constrained-rational expectation equilibrium*" (CREE), where rational expectation (REE) is a special case

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 - Agents select their belief from a constrained set
 - Minimize distance from the endogenous distribution of observables
 - Foundation as the limit of Bayesian/Adaptative learning
 - Concept of "*Constrained-rational expectation equilibrium*" (CREE), where rational expectation (REE) is a special case
2. New deviation from REE with low-dimensional (linear) hidden factor models
 - Conditions for amplification and persistence of shocks
3. Applications to medium scale DSGE, for quantitative results.

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 - Measure of *distance* between the beliefs $Q_\theta(dy)$ and reality of observables $T(dy)$
 3. Constrained rational-expectations equilibrium (CRRE) as fixed-point (invariant distribution) of steps 1. and 2.

Model – Step 1 – Recursive Temporary equilibrium T

- Agents make choices x_t , see observables y_t
- States z_t are unobserved and follow $z_t \sim \Pi(\cdot|y_{t-1}, z_{t-1})$
- Agent believe $y_t \sim Q_\theta(\cdot|y_{t-1})$, i.e. subjective model of transitions

$$V(x_-, y, \theta) = \max_{x \in \Gamma(x_-, y)} J(x_-, x, y') = \max_{x \in \Gamma(x_-, y)} \left[u(x_-, x, y) + \beta \int_Y V(x, y', \theta) Q_\theta(dy' | y) \right]$$

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- A recursive temporary equilibrium is a transition probability $T : (x_-, y_-, z_-, \theta) \mapsto T(x, y, z|x_-, y_-, z_-, \theta) \in \mathcal{P}(X \times Y \times Z)$, s.t. :

- (i) Agents decisions are optimal :

$$x \in \mathbf{x}(x_-, x, y') = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in \Gamma(x_-, y)} J(x_-, x, y') \quad \text{for } T\text{-a.e. } (x, y)$$

- (ii) General-equilibrium requirement are satisfied :

$$G(x, y, z) = 0,$$

- (iii) Consistency between transition of state and equilibrium outcomes :

$$T(B|x_-, y_-, z_-, \theta) = \Pi(B|y_-, z_-, \theta) \quad \forall B \subset Z$$

Model – Step 2 – Set of beliefs / Kullback-Leibner div.

- ▶ Parameters of agents' belief are included in a (potentially constrained) *set of models* $\theta \in \Theta$
 - Choose the model – used for Q_θ (density q_θ) – to be the closest to the distribution of observables, i.e. $T(x, y, z|x_-, y_-, z_-, \theta)$
- ▶ Imply to minimize the Kullback-Leibner divergence, i.e. for any μ

$$H(Q_\theta, T, \mu) = - \int_{X \times Y \times Z} \int_Y \log(q_\theta(y|y_-)) T(dy|x_-, y_-, z_-, \theta) \mu(dx_- \times dy_- \times dz_-)$$

- If $Q_\theta(dy) \equiv T(dy|\cdot)$ μ -a.e. then $H(Q_\theta, T, \mu) = 0$
- Θ may not contains the model generating T , in such case, the agents' model is *misspecified*
- Bayesian/Adaptative learning foundation for this distance

Model – Step 3 – CRRE

- ▶ For a given temporary equilibrium T , a constrained rational-expectations equilibrium (CRRE) is a triple (T, μ^*, Θ^*) s.t. :
 - (i) There is a fixed point of the temporary equilibrium, i.e. μ^* is the stationary distribution of T , (i.e. $\mu^* = \mu^* T$)
 - (ii) The agent optimally choose its best model :

$$\Theta^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta \in \Theta} H(Q_\theta, T, \mu^*)$$
 - (iii) μ^* is supported on $X \times Y \times Z \times \Theta^*$
- ▶ **Thm 1** : If the economy has a continuous temporary eq. T , then a CRRE exists
- ▶ *Proof* : Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan fixed point theorem.

Learning foundations for CREE

- ▶ Bayesian and Adaptive learning equilibria as foundation for the minimization of K-L-div.
- ▶ Bayesian equilibrium :

$$\mathbb{P} \left[(x_t, y_t, z_t, \lambda_t) \in B \mid \{x_s, y_s, z_s, \lambda_s\}_{s=0}^{t-1} \right] = T(B \mid x_{t-1}, y_{t-1}, z_{t-1}, \theta), \quad \forall B$$

- ▶ Asymptotic Mean stationarity : with $\mu_t(B) = \mathbb{P}((x_t, y_t, z_t, \theta) \in B)$,

$$\bar{\mu}_t(B) = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \mu_s(B) \xrightarrow[t \rightarrow \infty]{\text{weakly}} \bar{\mu}(B)$$

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- ▶ **Thm 2** : For T a continuous temporary eq., if it is asymptotic mean stationary then there is a proba distribution μ^* and Θ^* closed set s.t. :

- For $U_1 \subset K \subset U_2$, we have $\mu^*(U_1) \leq \bar{\mu}_t(B) \leq \mu^*(U_2)$
- $U \supset \Theta^*$ then $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \bar{\lambda}_t(U) = 1$
- The triple (T, μ^*, Θ^*) is a CREE

- *Proof* : LLN for Markov chains and extension of stat-result on concentration of Bayes estimates on minimizers of K-L-div.

Hidden factor model

- ▶ Agent subjective model of the economy (like a filtering problem) :
 - Underlying state : $\omega_t = A\omega_{t-1} + \epsilon_{\omega t}$
 - Observables : $o_t = B'\omega_t + \epsilon_{ot}$
 - Estimates (Kalman updating) : $\hat{\omega}_t = (A - KB')\hat{\omega}_{t-1} + Ko_t$
 - Parameters : $\theta = (A, B, \sigma_\omega, \sigma_o)$

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▶ Real model of the economy, i.e T temporary eq. :

- Optimal choice : $x_t = (c, 1)o_t + \mathbb{E}_t^\theta \left[\sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \beta^s (c, 1) o_{t+s} \right]$
- Equilibrium condition : $o_t = (x_t, z_t)'$
- State evolution $z_t = \rho z_{t-1} + \varepsilon$

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▶ If rational expectations :

- Rational estimates : $\omega_t = z_t, A = \rho, B = (1/(1 - c - \beta\rho), 1)$ etc.
- Agents reacts : $x_t^{REE} = \frac{1}{1-c-\beta\rho} z_t$

Hidden factor model - Amplification and persistence

- Suppose the set constraint is s.t. $\Theta = \{\theta\} = \{A, B, \sigma_\omega, \sigma_o\}$
(only one model at their disposal)

$$x_t^{CRRE} = \frac{1}{1 - c - \beta\varphi_{(A,B)}k_x} \left[\beta\varphi_{(A,B)}(A - KB')\hat{\omega}_{t-1} + (1 + \beta\varphi_{(A,B)}k_z)z_t \right]$$

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- ▶ Amplification of shocks :
 - **Prop 4** : Depending on parameters, shocks to states (ε_t) amplify agents choice x_t under CREE.
- ▶ Persistence of shocks :
 - **Prop 5** : Depending on parameters, shocks to states (ε_t) are history-dependent under CREE.
- ▶ Extension : with larger Θ could compute and minimize the K-L-div. and choose the

Quantitative exploration

- ▶ Medium scale DSGE model a la Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005) / Smets-Wouters (2007)
 - Agents observation and could form expectation on 14 variables in the economy
 - Only dispose of a one-factor linear model (or d for CREE- d model)
- ▶ Results :
 - Hump-shape response to TFP/Monetary shocks
 - Amplification of demand shocks (discount/gov spending) and ability to generate business cycle

Quantitative exploration




Figure 2. Impulse responses to the TFP shock

Quantitative exploration




Figure 7. Impulse responses to the government-spending shock

Conclusion

- ▶ Good attempt to unify the different models of bounded rationality with a single flexible framework
 - Can be adapted to many macro models
 - Could maybe draw some insights from the stochastic control literature
- ▶ Intuitive to think that agents have simpler models of the economy
- ▶ Interesting quantitative results